











































How do Antitakeover Amendments Affect Shareholder Value?
嫉 要　旨 嫉
Japanese companies begin to adopt antitakeover amendments as Japanese
companies’cross-shareholding decreases.  Antitakeover amendments could
decrease shareholder value by managerial entrenchment effects and could
increase shareholder value by preventing value decreasing takeover attempts.
By surveying many previous studies in the U.S., the following conditions become
apparent.  The effects of introduction of antitakeover amendments on shareholder
value are apparently mixed.  However, this study finds that each antitakeover
amendment has different effects on shareholder value and it makes the interpre-
tation of previous studies difficult.  Additionally, institutional investors’sharehold-
ing increases shareholder value at the adoption of antitakeover amendments.
キーワード：コーポレートガバナンス(Corporate Governance)、
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Non-Fair Price Amendments（Jarrell and Poulsen の中の






Jarrell and Poulsen（1988）は、Dual-Class Stock






























































































































































































































Linn and McConnell (1983)

















Cumulative daily average abnomal
return 40日前から40日後

































































































































































































































entrenched boards’Journal of Financial Economics 78(2)
pp.409-433.
Bebchuk, Lucian, John C. Coates Ⅳ and Guhan Subramanian(2002)
‘The powerful Antitakeover of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence and Policy’NBER Working Paper Series, Working
Paper 8974.
Berkovitch, Elazar and Naveen Khanna (1990)‘How Target
Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive
Strategies in Takeovers’Journal of Finance 45 (1), pp.137-156 
Bhagat, Sanjai (1983)‘The Effect of Pre-Emptive Right
Amendments on Shareholder Wealth’Journal of Financial
Economics 12 pp.289-310.
Bhagat, Sanjai and James A. Brickley (1984)‘Cumulative Voting:
The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights’Journal of
Law and Economics (27), pp.339-365.
Bhagat, Sanjai and James and Richard H. Jefferis (1991)‘Voting
Power in the Proxy Process: The Effects of Antitakeover
amendments’ Journal of Finance 30 pp.193-225.
Bhagat, Sanjai and Richard H. Jefferis, Jr. (1994) ‘The Causes and
Consequences of Takeover Defense: Evidence from
Greenmail’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 1(2), pp.201-231.
Bizjak, John M. and Christopher J. Marquette (1998)‘Are
Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from
Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills’Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33(4) pp. 499-521.
Brickley, James A. Jeffrey L. Coles and Rory L. Terry (1994),
‘Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills’Journal
of Financial Economics, 35(3), pp.371-390. 
Brickley, James A., Rinald C.Lease, and Clifford W. Smith, (1988),
Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover
Amendments, Journal of Financial Economics 32, pp.195-221.
Comment, Robert and G. William Shwert (1995),‘Poison or
Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of
Modern Antitakeover Amendments’Journal of Financial
Economics 35(1) pp.3-43.
Core, John E., Wayne R. Guay, T and Jomme O. Rusticus, (2006)
‘Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An
Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors'
Expectations’, Journal of Finance, 61(2), pp.655-688.
Daines, Robert and Michael Klaesner (2001)‘Do IPO Charters
Mazimize Firm value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs’
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 17 pp.83-120.
Danielson, Morris G. and Jonathan M. Karpoff (1998),‘On the
uses of corporate governance provisions’Journal of
Corporate Finance, 4(4), pp.347-371 
Danielson, Morris G. and Jonathan M. Karpoff (2006),‘Do pills
poison operating performance’Journal of Corporate Finance,
12(3), pp.536-559 
Datta, Sudip and Mai Iskandar-Datta (1996),‘Takeover defenses
and wealth effects on securityholders: The case of poison pill
adoptions’Journal of Banking and Finance, pp.1231-1250 
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo and Edward M. Rice‘Going
Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth’,
Journal of Law and Economics, 27(2), pp. 367-401.
DeAngelo, Harry and Edward Rice, (1983)‘Antitakeover Charter
Amendments and Stockholder Wealth’Journal of Financial
Economics 32, pp.329-360.
Garvey, Gerald T. and Gordon Hanka (1999)‘Capital Structure
and Corporate Control: The Effects of Antitakeover Statues on
Firm Levarage’Journal of Finance 54(2) pp.519-546.
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishi and Andrew Metrick (2003)‘Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices’Quarterly Journal of
Economics 118(1) pp.107-155.
Heron, Randall A., and Erik Lie (2006),‘On the Use of Poison
Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets’, Journal of
Business pp.1783-1807.
Higgins, Huong N, and Judy Beckman (2006)‘Abnormal Returns
of Japanese Acquisition Bidders-Impact of pro-M&A
Legislation in the 1990s’Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 14
pp.250-268.
Jarrell, Gregg A. and Annette Poulsen, (1987),‘Shark Repellents
and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover amendments
since 1980s’Journal of Financial Economics 19 pp.127-168.
Jarrell, Gregg A. and Annette B. Poulsen (1988)‘Dual-class recap-
italizations as antitakeover mechanisms: The recent evidence’
Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.129-152 
Jiraporn, Pornsit (2005)‘An Empirical Analysis of Corporate
Takeover Defenses and Earnings Management: Evidence from
the U.S.’Applied Financial Economics 15(5) pp.293-303
Johnson, Mark S., and Ramesh P. Rao (1997)‘The of impact
Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate Financial





































28）正確には、Gompers, Ishi and Metrick（2003）は、株主の
権利と経営者の権利のバランスが、特に、強い経営者の
権利が、企業収益にどのように影響するのかに関心があ
る。Core, Wayne and Rusticus（2006）は、Gompers, Ishi
and Metrickの結果について懐疑的である。










にしている。Blanck Check Preferred Stockとは、定款に具
体的な条件を定めずに発行できる優先株式である。詳し
くは、Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian（2002）を参照さ
れたい。
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